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JOINT INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

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From: 14 December 1950  
To : 20 December 1950  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2  
Department of the Army  
Washington 25, D. C.  
21 December 1950

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet armed forces in being are in an advanced stage of readiness for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Military and political indications are that the Communists intend to insist upon a solution of problems of controversy strictly along lines which further Communist world objectives. There are no indications that the Soviets and their Communist allies in pursuing their major objectives intend to avoid future actions which might precipitate global hostilities.
- b. The repeatedly stated objective of the Chinese Communists is the elimination or withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. There are military indications that Chinese Communist and North Korean forces are preparing for further military action.
- c. Intelligence continues to indicate Chinese Communist determination to eliminate all Western influence from China and to extend Chinese Communist domination over Southeast Asia.
- d. Viet Minh preparations for offensive operations against the French in Tonkin continue and unconfirmed reports may indicate that Chinese Communist troops in various guises either have entered or are preparing to enter Indo-China.
- e. There are indications that the Soviets intend to reinforce their forces in Germany, and there is continuing evidence of increasing military capabilities of the European Satellites. Communist propaganda and diplomacy, relating to West Germany and the Balkans, may indicate that the Soviets intend to secure their objectives in Europe by force, but there are no conclusive indications of the probability of imminent hostilities in Europe.

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## 2. SUMMARY OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. KOREA--Although recent enemy activity in Korea has not been aggressive, there are indications that reorganized North Korean units are moving southward and that Chinese Communist forces are also moving south and east possibly in preparation for an enveloping attack against the 8th Army area. PW's have stated that the North Koreans are expecting Chinese Communist reinforcements for an attack. The evidence indicates that Communist forces are preparing for an attack to the south, possibly spearheaded by North Koreans. There is a continuing possibility of a major Communist air effort.
- b. CHINA--Chinese Communist Field Force strength is increasing and a new field army (the Sixth) is reportedly being formed in South China. The buildup of air facilities continues, with indications that the Shanghai area may be a major base of operations. Chinese Communist efforts to curtail Western influence in China have been intensified, and their propaganda continues to indicate that they intend not only to drive the U.N. forces from Korea but to strike other blows against the "imperialist encirclement."
- c. JAPAN--No further information on the possible formation of Japanese units on Soviet territory has been received and it is believed that one such report recently received was probably a plant. The buildup of air facilities at Shanghai poses a threat to the Ryukyus.
- d. INDO-CHINA--The Viet Minh forces are preparing for an early offensive against the Hanoi-Haiphong road and have reinforced southern Tonkin. Unconfirmed reports state there are four Chinese Communist divisions in Tonkin. Other unconfirmed reports have indicated a movement of three Chinese Communist armies to the Indo-China border.
- e. BURMA--Unconfirmed reports indicate that Soviet observers have visited an airfield in northern Burma and that the Chinese Communists are building defensive positions along the Burma frontier.
- f. GERMANY--Reports indicate that the Soviets will probably utilize their rehabilitated barracks area south of Berlin to house new troops from the U.S.S.R. and that a reinforcement of Germany may be planned in the very near future. The extent and type of reinforcement cannot now be determined but the barracks capacity of 35,000 to 40,000 troops suggests that a major new unit, possibly of corps or army size, will move in.

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- g. **EASTERN EUROPE**--There are indications that the Czech Army is being reorganized along Soviet lines, that long-runway airfield construction is encircling Prague similar to the pattern around Berlin and that a large blood plasma bank is being established in Prague. Shipping to both Bulgaria and Albania has increased in recent months. Communist propaganda against both Greece and Yugoslavia has been intensified but the Bulgarians are showing a conciliatory attitude toward Turkey. Drastic restrictions on the movements of Western attaches in Poland may be expected at any time.
  - h. **GENERAL**--Soviet and Satellite propaganda continues to give major emphasis to the theme of West German rearmament and threats of its consequences, and the Soviet Union has charged France and the U.K. with violations of their wartime treaties with the U.S.S.R. There are no positive indications of unusual Soviet merchant ship activity or confirmation of reports of withdrawal of Soviet vessels from Baltic runs.
3. **COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES**--The Chinese Communists and North Koreans retain their capabilities for major offensive action in Korea. Chinese Communist ground and air capabilities are generally increasing and their capabilities for intervention in Indo-China have possibly increased. European Satellite capabilities, particularly in the Balkans, are steadily increasing. There has been no major apparent change in Soviet capabilities but a substantial reinforcement of Germany may occur shortly.

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TAB "A"

REPORT OF INDICATIONS OF SOVIET-COMMUNIST INTENTIONS

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee  
20 December 1950

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. Enemy military preparations in Korea and the tenor of Chinese Communist statements continue to indicate that the Communist objective is to drive the U.N. forces from Korea and that preparations are being made for a drive to the south.

- (1) Enemy activity in Korea during the week continued to be marked by a lack of aggressive action. Despite the reported lack of movement of large forces, however, there were indications of Communist preparations for renewed attacks and the pattern of enemy activity showed many similarities to that which preceded the earlier Chinese Communist offensive. Of the estimated 100,000 operational North Korean troops, about 25,000 are in contact with U.N. forces in the 8th Army area and the remaining 75,000 are not firmly located but are believed to be moving towards the 8th Army front. In addition, some 45,000 North Korean troops estimated to be in training or in unidentified units may appear at the front at any time, as it is apparent that a rapid reorganization of the North Korean Army has been under way, eleven newly identified divisions having already been reported.
- (2) Chinese Communist strength in Korea is now estimated at 285,000. Chinese Communist forces south of Pyongyang have been estimated as equivalent to only two divisions. Reasons for the apparent delay in the Chinese Communist advance are speculative, but possible causes are either an intention to concentrate Chinese Communist troops still deployed in the northeast (U.S. 10th Corps area) for any new major offensive or a desire to await the arrival of heavy Soviet equipment which the Chinese Communists have not to date employed. Continuing reports of troop and vehicular movements south from the Manchurian border indicate either that the Chinese Communist forces are receiving replacements or that new Chinese Communist units are moving into Korea. Observations of

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the forward movement of small groups of troops may indicate that a larger build-up than has been detected is under way to the north and east of Seoul and that an envelopment of the 8th Army right flank is planned. North Korean PW's in the 8th Army area have stated that the North Korean troops east of Pyongyang are waiting for the Chinese to join them before commencing operations and that the North Koreans have been told that the Chinese Communists will launch an attack to seize Seoul about the first of January.

- (3) There continue to be indications of a possible major Communist air effort against U.N. forces in Korea, although enemy pilots to date have generally failed to press attacks against U.N. aircraft. A U.S. Air Force 3-26 was attacked at night by an unidentified aircraft northwest of Pyongyang this week, the first occurrence of such enemy attacks at night. The continuing general build-up of over-all Chinese Communist air capabilities, noted in paragraph b. below, also indicates a possibility of substantially increased air action in Korea.
- (4) Chinese Communist propaganda continues to indicate that their objective is to force the U.N. forces from Korea. Frequent references to the breaking of imperialist "encirclement," a demand that the United States abandon all war preparation, propaganda blasts against Great Britain as well as the United States, together with continuing demands for withdrawal of the U.S. Naval Forces from around Formosa and participation in the Japanese treaty discussions, indicate that the Chinese Communists do not intend to limit their demands to Korea and that Korea may not even be the major objective.


b. There are indications that the Chinese Communists are continuing to build up both their ground and air capabilities and are continuing their campaign to eliminate Western influence in China.



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
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- (2) There is considerable evidence to indicate that the Shanghai area may be the chief operational center of the Chinese Communist Air Force. Physical installations are reported to include facilities for all types of aircraft from jets to four-engine long-range bombers. Recent reports indicate that airfields in the Shanghai area are being readied for operational use, that there has been a stockpiling of petroleum, spare parts and ammunition, and that AA defenses and coastal defense positions have been installed under Soviet supervision.



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Reports continue to indicate reconstruction of other airfields in South and Central China. Reports of a POL shortage among civilian consumers in China may reflect a stockpiling for military use, and there are continuing indications that the Chinese Communists are succeeding in smuggling petroleum products despite Western restrictions.

- (3) Chinese Communist efforts to eliminate Western influence are reflected in increasing anti-European propaganda as well as continuing heavy anti-American propaganda. French properties have been confiscated in Shanghai as a result of which the French are closing their Consulate in Canton and are planning to close their establishments in Kunming, Nanking, and Chungking.

c. No further information has been received with regard to possible Soviet training of Japanese units and there is now reason to believe that the report of arrival of Japanese troops in the Vladivostok area in early November may have been a Soviet plant. There is no firm information to support rumors of Sino-Soviet plans to attack U.S. air bases in the Ryukyus in the near future, although the build-up of Chinese Communist air facilities in the Shanghai area poses a definite threat to the Ryukyus.

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d. There continues to be no firm indications of an imminent Chinese Communist threat to Hong Kong.

e. In Indo-China, Viet Minh movements reported during the week continue to indicate a probable early offensive against the Hanoi-Haiphong road. Four Viet Minh regiments have recently moved into the southern Tonkin delta area from Annam. There have been recent unconfirmed reports of the presence in Tonkin of four Chinese Communist divisions, a development which is possible although no identification is available. A report that a joint corps of Viet Minh and Chinese Communist troops, totalling 40,000 men, crossed into Indo-China in three columns in September 1950 has been previously received. The French have reported that a Chinese Communist artillery battalion is on the border area near Moncay. Press reports from Taipei state that the 13th, 14th, and 15th Chinese Communist Armies are poised on the Indo-China border. These armies are estimated to be in the general Yunnan-Kwangsi area and their movement close to the border itself is not confirmed. It is probable that any Chinese Communist intervention in Indo-China would come from these units. Reports continue to be received of the training of Viet Minh air force personnel on Hainan Island, and the latest of these states that some 500 Viet Minh and 1,000 Chinese Communists are being trained there as paratroopers. Continuing reports of extensive work on the Canton airfields are also pertinent to possible Chinese Communist air action against Indo-China.

f. The Burmese Government is investigating but has not yet confirmed a report that two Soviet observers, in the guise of traders, and a small detachment of Chinese Communist soldiers visited Putao (Fort Hertz) in northern Burma and were obviously interested in the wartime-built U.S. airfield. Other reports have indicated that the Chinese Communists are becoming increasingly concerned over expanding Burmese-U.S. cooperation. The Chinese Communists have reportedly been constructing defensive positions along the China-Burma frontier and along the Burma road in China, allegedly because they believe that the U.S. is preparing for intervention in southwest China.

g. Recent reports have indicated that the Communists in the Philippines are engaged in "tabulating" supplies entering and leaving Clark Air Force Base and that one responsibility of the Huk insurgents is to prepare a weekly report on American and Philippine troop movements.

h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) Military and political indications are that the Communist intention is to drive the U.N. forces from Korea and that North Korean and Chinese Communist troops are preparing for an offensive to the south.

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- (2) Continuing reports of a build-up of Chinese Communist ground and air strength and Chinese Communist propaganda indicate that their objectives are not limited to the conquest of Korea but that they intend further action to weaken the Western position in Asia.
- (3) There are continuing indications of Viet Minh preparations for attacks in the Tonkin delta and unconfirmed reports that Chinese Communist troops have moved closer to the Indo-China border or are actually now in Tonkin.
- (4) There are no firm indications of imminent major Communist action in other areas of Asia but reports of Chinese Communist assistance to dissident movements in Southeast Asia continue.

## 2. Indications of Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. The Soviet rehabilitation of a large barracks area capable of housing 35,000 to 40,000 troops at Zossen/Wunsdorf south of Berlin was reported last week, with a comment that the Soviets might intend to reinforce their forces in Germany or to utilize the area as a new command headquarters. Information now available indicates that the U.S.S.R. most probably intends a reinforcement of Germany. Some 6,800 unidentified Soviet troops moved into the new barracks on 4-5 December. Two reports which are possibly connected have indicated that the U.S.S.R. ordered the assembling of 600 flat cars at three points in Germany by 15 December (purpose and destination unknown) and that plans were being made for the reception of 120,000 Soviet troops in the Zossen/Wunsdorf area between 20 and 26 December. It is possible that the flat cars were intended for a movement of equipment from the U.S.S.R. coincident with the arrival of new troops, although there is no firm evidence to support this and there is some possibility that the cars were intended for the movement of reparations. The numbers of troops allegedly expected appears much exaggerated for the time allowed and the capacity of the barracks, and to date no evidence is available that any large-scale troop movement into Germany has begun. All reports considered together, however, do indicate that some Soviet troop movement into Germany is probably planned in the near future and it is possible that the movement reportedly planned in the next few days may be only the beginning of a larger move spread over a longer period. The numbers of flatcars reportedly assembled is considerably less than that required to move one Soviet mechanized or tank division, but Soviet stockpiles in Germany might serve to provide considerable equipment for new units. At present no firm conclusion can be reached as to the type and extent of any planned Soviet reinforcement of Germany, but the capacity of the new barracks alone would suggest that a substantial reinforcement, possibly an additional army, may be intended. There is no information to indicate any current unusual

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activities of Soviet forces now in Germany, and there have been no reports of possible winter maneuvers such as are reportedly planned in Austria.

b. Reports continue to indicate a steady increase in Satellite military preparations in Southeast Europe. It is apparent that some reorganization of the Czech Army is under way, along with previously reported reinforcement of the western frontier, although no firm evidence of its nature has been received. There is, however, increasing evidence that the Czech Army is being patterned closely along Soviet lines and the new Czech uniforms and insignia after 1 January are to be almost identical with the Soviet. In connection with previous reports that the Czechs have purchased a large blood transfusion plant, it is now reported that all persons in Prague between the ages of 14 and 40 are being blood-typed and a blood plasma bank is being established. Airfield construction in Czechoslovakia is providing Prague with a circle of long-runway fields in a pattern similar to that achieved around Berlin. In Hungary a new decree provides that university students will take military training after 1 February, apparently to increase the supply of available reserve officers. A report that military cargoes en route from Italy to Latin America during November were diverted to Bulgarian Black Sea ports is not itself confirmed, but there have been other indications that shipping to both Bulgaria and Albania has increased in recent months. There continue to be no firm indications (based on a lack of reports of unusual troop movements) that the Satellites are planning any immediate aggression in the Balkans but all information continues to indicate a steady build-up of Satellite capabilities for such action.

c. In addition to the previously reported intensified Greek Communist charges that the U.S. is preparing for aggression in the Balkans, the Hungarians have reportedly delivered a note to Yugoslavia demanding Yugoslav cessation of border violations and stating that these provocations are proof of the aggressive and hostile policy of the Yugoslav Government. In contrast to these charges there has been little Communist propaganda directed at Turkey, and the Bulgarians have recently shown a much more conciliatory attitude towards Turkey in negotiations on the question of emigration of Turks from Bulgaria. This change in attitude may be an attempt to lull Turkish suspicions or to minimize the possibility of Turkish intervention in the event of aggression against Greece or Yugoslavia.

d. Further indications of a tightening of security in Czechoslovakia have included a purge within the security forces and further efforts to curtail foreign Consulates. Drastic restrictions on the movements of Western attaches in Poland may be expected at any time.

e. Soviet and Satellite propaganda during the week continued to give major emphasis to the theme of West German rearmament with threats as to the consequences of such action. The U.S.S.R. handed

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notes to France and the United Kingdom charging that plans for the rearming of Germany violated their wartime treaties with the Soviet Union, and the note to France included the statement so often enunciated in Communist propaganda recently that "all responsibility for the situation" would rest with France. Considerable publicity was given to the passing of "Peace Laws" in the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Rumania. These laws are ostensibly designed to prevent "war-mongering," but probably also are intended to reinforce existing measures against dissemination of information, particularly on military preparations.

The East German law by implication also threatens West Germans who cooperate in measures for German rearmament with criminal prosecution and this is intended to promote West German opposition to participation in defense plans. Soviet and Satellite propaganda has not yet specifically connected the U.S. state of emergency proclamation with West German rearmament. Soviet comment on the emergency proclamation to date has been confined to statements in Pravda that "the fresh aggressive measures of the United States cannot fail to attract the attention of the Soviet Union and of other countries," and that "the Soviet people will intensify their vigilance towards the aggressive powers." The propaganda has not yet attempted to justify the necessity of a "defensive war" to thwart the plans of the United States. The report last week of a possible shift in the Communist propaganda line to a justification of Soviet offensive action has not been confirmed by information on Communist propaganda in other European countries. A report this week, however, states that [redacted] was reportedly advised to be ready to depart for the U.S.S.R. in April, as the declaration of a state of emergency in the U.S. is an overt act which will result in counteraction.

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f. The State Bank of the U.S.S.R. which has maintained large sums in time deposits at a Brussels Bank, recently closed out such accounts in favor of regular commercial accounts. This change permits the U.S.S.R. to transfer its funds to other countries by cable at a moment's notice in contrast to the time deposits which could be withdrawn only on maturity in periods varying from 30 days to a year. The State Bank of the U.S.S.R. uses regular commercial accounts in New York City rather than time deposits. No other significant changes in Soviet or Satellite banking practice in Western countries have been reported.

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g. [redacted] there had been a gradual but substantial reduction in Soviet merchant shipping in the Baltic area and that 61 vessels had been withdrawn for no apparent reason. There is no information available to U.S. intelligence which confirms this report and there is no evidence of a recent decrease in Soviet and Polish merchant traffic through the Kiel Canal. Available information indicates that Soviet merchant ship traffic outside Communist waters is about normal and there are no positive indications of unusual Soviet merchant marine activity.

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h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are indications that the Soviets intend to reinforce their forces in Germany, and there is continuing evidence of increasing military capabilities of the European Satellites.
- (2) The intensification of Communist propaganda charging the U.S. with aggressive designs in the Balkans and Communist threats of the consequences of West German rearmament may indicate that the Soviets intend to secure their objectives in Europe by force, but there are no conclusive indications of the probability of imminent hostilities in Europe.

  
JOHN WECKERLING  
Brigadier General, GSC  
Chairman, Joint Intelligence  
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